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THE TONLE SAP: RECONSIDERATION
OF THE LAWS GOVERNING CAMBODIA’S
MOST IMPORTANT FISHERY
Ian J. Mensher†
Abstract: The Tonle Sap Basin is not only Cambodia’s largest inland fishery, but
also the source of food and income for roughly one million Cambodians. Its biodiversity
is unrivaled within Southeast Asia, and its sustainability is vital to the socioeconomic and
political stability in the region. However, Cambodia’s current fishery, forestry, and land
laws do not adequately protect the Tonle Sap Basin from over-fishing and the
introduction of sedimentation and pollution caused by increasing development. The laws
do not create or reflect a model for sustainable fishing and development. Both the laws
currently in force and proposed legislation fail to limit logging, farming and damming
activities that ruin fish habitat and create economic and social instability. The myriad
laws are at times too narrowly tailored to provide adequate protection or so broad as to
create loopholes allowing adverse impacts from the development of agricultural lands,
the use of pesticides, and the creation of dams. The laws also fail to meet the
constitutional requirements and international agreements binding upon Cambodia. To
remedy these legal and policy gaps, the Cambodian government should reform the
current and proposed legislation to create more formal prohibitions on harmful activities
and enhance local control over the management and monitoring of fishing. Stronger laws
are needed to stop the introduction of further sediment and chemical agents into the Tonle
Sap Basin. Moreover, the government must close discretionary loopholes and
incorporate local users into a broad vision of sustainable management on the Tonle Sap
Basin.

I.

INTRODUCTION

From the end of French colonial reign, Cambodia has struggled to find
political, social, and legal stability. After the rule of Pol Pot1 and a
succession of unstable socialist governments,2 Cambodia only recently
transformed into a constitutional monarchy. Full democratization has not
occurred and Cambodia still relies heavily on international aid for civil
stability. While some may contend that its entry into World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) marks an important transition, the country and its

†

J.D. expected June 2007. The author would like to thank Professor William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Alyssa Vegter, Courtney Mertes, and Jessica Levin for their help, interest, and support.
1
See Kingdom of Cambodia, Cambodia Country History, http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/unisql1/
egov/english/country.history.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
2
Ending Pol Pot’s regime in 1979, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, creating the socialist
People’s Republic of Kampuchea. After years of opposition, the Cambodian monarchy bartered a deal for
Vietnamese removal in 1989. Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge remained an opposition force and did not partake in
the elections in the newly formed Kingdom of Cambodia, a constitutional monarchy with the monarchy of
King Sihanouk. Privatization commenced between 1989 and 1992, ending the era of collectivism. See id.
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population remain largely impoverished and undereducated.3 “The legal
framework is dismal,” and progress is slow-paced in the vacuum of proper
governance.4 Despite the presence of political discord, Cambodia’s leaders
are aware of the environmental problems that accompany modernization and
expansion.5 In part, this stems from Cambodia’s reliance on its fisheries for
food, income, and social harmony. As the country’s population expands,
demand for its resources increases and development alters the landscape,
Cambodia must decide how to maintain and support the biodiversity and
health of its inland fisheries while allowing the country to expand in the
world market.
Because the Tonle Sap Basin (“Tonle Sap”)6 is Cambodia’s largest
source of fish, it stands as an excellent vehicle for addressing the woeful
gaps in Cambodia’s fishery and environmental laws and policy. Considered
the most important fishery in the country,7 the Tonle Sap is an irreplaceable
social and economic resource.8 Fishing in the Tonle Sap supports both
domestic subsistence and mid-size fishing,9 while industrial-level export
continues to increase in its share of the overall catch. Surrounding countries
have set their sights not only on fish, but also on the hydroelectric and
timber potential of the Tonle Sap.10 Although the Tonle Sap is still a viable
fishery, without proper legal reform, increased agency coordination and

3
See Rebecca Povarchuk, Cambodia’s WTO Accession: A Strenuous but Necessary Step for a Poor
Nation Seeking Economic Prosperity, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 645 (2004). This is a decidedly positive
review of Cambodia’s entry into the WTO.
4
Sith Samath et al, Addressing Anarchy: Decentralisation and Natural Resource Management in
Ratanakiri Province, Upland Cambodia, in INSTITUTIONS, LIVELIHOODS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CHANGE
AND RESPONSE IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 367 (Andrea Straub ed., 2001).
5
Recognition of the environmental problems facing Cambodia can be seen in a host of laws and
regulations, including the Constitution, the Environmental Laws, the new Forestry Law, the International
Wetlands agreement, and the designation of the Tonle Sap as a UNESCO Protected Biosphere.
6
The Tonle Sap Basin refers to the areas of the Tonle Sap River at its confluence with the Mekong
River.
7
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE TONLE SAP BASIN STRATEGY (2005). Seventy-five percent
of Cambodians rely almost entirely on fish for protein. See Mlup Baitong, Cambodia Environment Fact
and Information, http://www.mlup.org/www.mlup.orgenglish/mlup%20baitong/Cam-face.html (last visited
May 12, 2006).
8
See Steven Sanderson, The Future of Conservation, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 162.
9
See Draft Fisheries Law (2001) (Cambodia), available at http://www.maff.gov.kh/
pdf/DraftFisheriesLaw.pdf.
10
China has proposed damming key tributaries to the Tonle Sap, which has direct and proximate
impact on the health and stability of the fishery. See Edward Lanfranco, China and the Mekong: A Tale of
Two Rivers, TERRADAILY, July 6, 2005, http://www.terradaily.com/news/water-earth-05j.html. Illegal
Timber trade has similarly destroyed key wetland areas of the Tonle Sap; Food and Agriculture
Organization of the U.N., For Cambodia’s ‘Great Lake’ and the Millions Who Depend on It, A New Lease
on Life, FAO NEWSROOM, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/field/2005/107684/index.html.
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environmental planning, it will likely become a wasteland of
mismanagement and exploitation.11
To demonstrate the lack of legal and administrative control over the
Tonle Sap, this Comment examines the frail legal regime that currently fails
to project a sustainable future for the fishery. Part II gives a brief summary
of the geography, history, land use, and fishery practices in and on the Tonle
Sap. Part III presents the theory of sustainability and summarizes the laws
governing the Tonle Sap, including the Draft Fisheries Law. Part IV gives a
detailed legal analysis of the fishery and related laws, highlighting the gaps,
loopholes, and policy failures in the current and proposed legal regimes.
Lastly, Part V provides a recommendation for changes within the
Cambodian legal regime, by comparing the Cambodian method of fishery
governance to other sustainable fisheries systems.12
II.

CAMBODIA AT THE CROSSROADS: INCREASING
DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMAND PLACE THE TONLE SAP
POSITION

POPULATION,
IN A PERILOUS

Like many Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia has begun to
modernize and integrate with world markets. At the same time, Cambodia’s
lands are largely undeveloped and contain delicately balanced, yet rich
natural resources. Thus, Cambodia sits at a junction from which it can either
pursue an environmentally sustainable path, or careen down one of shortterm profits and long-term disappointment. Nowhere is this dilemma more
apparent than around the Tonle Sap. As Southeast Asia’s largest freshwater
lake and basin, the Tonle Sap is home to an incredible amount of animal life.
These living resources are the major source of food and labor for over one
million Cambodians.13 Yet because of the relatively new systems of private
land tenure, international export of fish, and privately operated forestry
practices, this natural resource remains in perilous straits. Unprotected
forests, poor scientific study, and outdated laws all contribute to these
problems. Despite these threats, Cambodia is in a position to remedy this
situation. To understand why Cambodia is well placed to create reasonable
11
See Trade and Environmental Database, TED Case Studies: Lake Victoria,
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/VICTORIA.HTM (last visited May 8, 2006). Lake
Victoria is an excellent example of poor management decisions, over-fishing, and pollution leading to the
demise of a powerful inland fishery; it is a model Cambodia must not emulate.
12
Specific attention will be paid to the Celilo Falls Fishery on the Columbia River in the
Northwestern United States, now buried behind the Dalles Dam.
13
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, SUMMARY OF INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT FOR TONLE SAP
SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROJECT IN CAMBODIA 3 (2005).
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and workable set of laws for the Tonle Sap’s sustainable future, it is
necessary to understand the current uses and demands on the Tonle Sap.
A.

The Tonle Sap Basin’s Unique Hydrology Supports Millions of People
and an Unparalleled Diversity of Fish, Birds, and Mammals

The Tonle Sap’s internationally renowned biodiversity is rooted in its
unique hydrology.14 During the dry season the Tonle Sap covers an area of
merely 2,500 square kilometers, but during the rainy season it swells up to
10,000-16,000 square kilometers.15 When flooded, the Tonle Sap takes up
roughly 44% of the total area of Cambodia.16 Nearly 60% of the basin’s
waters flow from the Mekong River.17 The hydrologic cycle of dry and wet
seasons helps replenish nutrients, increase spawning areas and expand
fishing access for Cambodians. However, this replenishment depends on the
health and existence of inundated forests.18 The roots of these trees trap
nutrients, filter the water, and create spawning habitat.19 Moreover, during
the rainy season, fish thrive on newly available nutrients in deep inland
rivers.20 The flood cycle also means that activities in the floodplain have a
direct effect on the water quality of the Tonle Sap.21 Activities such as
logging loosen sediment, increase siltation of the basin, and introduce
residual chemicals into the water when the Basin floods.22 Flood season also
brings human and chemical waste into the Tonle Sap from downstream cities
on the Mekong, especially from Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s largest city.23
Because of this rejuvenating hydrology, the Tonle Sap is also home to
a rich array of human and animal life. The rainy season backflow creates
unique habitat that supports fish, birds, buffalo, and humans.24 Although
14
See United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Man and Biosphere
Programme, Biosphere Reserve Information: Tonle Sap, http://www2.unesco.org/mab/br/brdir/directory/
biores.asp?mode=all&code=CAM+01 (last visited May 8, 2006).
15
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 1.
16
Id. at 1.
17
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 13, at 5.
18
See id.; see also Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9; JOSEPH KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, (2d ed. 2002) (stating the general importance of wetlands to the health and
biodiversity of fisheries).
19
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 13, at 10.
20
Id.
21
See OLIVIER SERRAT, THREATS TO THE TONLE SAP 2 (2005), available at http://www.adb.org/
Projects/Tonle_Sap/Speeches/threats-tonle-sap.pdf.
22
World Lakes Network, Experience and Lessons Learned Brief for Tonle Sap, Jan. 20, 2004, at 7,
http://www.worldlakes.org/uploads/Tonle_Sap_Brief_20Jan04.pdf.
23
See generally David Lague, Water Crisis Shows China’s Pollution Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2005, at A6.
24
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TONLE SAP BASIN MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION II, at 1 (2004).
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studies are only beginning to explore the depth and breadth of this fishery,
its importance is unquestioned.25 Estimates indicate that from 200 to over
800 species of fish, including the rare, giant catfish,26 inhabit the Tonle
Sap.27 Migratory birds from Southeast Asia also make use of the Tonle Sap,
while crocodiles, birds,28 deer, and buffalo roam its shores and 45 different
habitats.29 Equally as important, over one million people, roughly 32% of
the total Cambodian population,30 rely on this fishery. The Tonle Sap
provides food and income, as well as social, cultural, and political stability.
Despite the rich biological resources of the Tonle Sap, however, between 40
and 60% of the households bordering it are below the official poverty line.31
B.

Current Fishing Practices on the Tonle Sap

There is increasing awareness of the economic, social, and political
importance of the Tonle Sap and the legal inadequacy of the Fisheries Law
to protect future fish stocks. Fishing in the Tonle Sap produces nearly
230,000 tons of fish annually, which supports roughly one million
Cambodians each year. Economically, this produces around $150-200
million a year, of which 25% comes from exports.32 The Tonle Sap actually
reaches into Thailand and is regarded by neighboring countries as a vital
natural resource.33
25
See E. Baran & T.A. Jantunen, WorldFish Center, A Bayesian Model of the Fish Production in the
Tonle Sap Great Lake, Cambodia (2004), http://www.worldefishcenter.org/projects/bayfish/Baran_
Jantunen_2004_Stakeholders_consultation_for_Bayesian_DSS.pdf (describing the importance of flooded
networks generally); Stefan Lovgren, Saving the Big Fish: Zeb Hogan Is Hooked on Rescuing the Catfish
of Cambodia from Oblivion, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Jan. 21, 2006, at 3.
26
Lovgren, supra note 25; see also Michael Sullivan, Tonle Sap: The Flowing Heart of Cambodia
(National Public Radio, Morning Edition broadcast Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=5039980; see also Kultida Samabuddhi & Theerawat Khamthita, Giant
Catfish Hunt Faces Extinction, BANGKOK POST (Thailand), May 2, 2005, (describing the deleterious effects
of hunting giant catfish).
27
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS, PROPOSED ASIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND GRANT KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA: TONLE SAP
SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROJECT, at v (2005). This survey suggests that there had once been 500
species of fish, but that over 300 of them have disappeared from the Tonle Sap.
28
Karen J. Coates, Plan Helps Birds, Villagers Thrive in Cambodia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar.
16, 2006, at 16 (describing attempts to stop bird hunting and egg poaching in Prek Toal, next to the Tonle
Sap).
29
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK supra note 7, at 8.
30
Id. at 1.
31
Id. at ii.
32
Id. at 1. The majority of the fish are exported to Thailand.
33
Concern over the health of the Tonle Sap and Mekong River helped create the inter-governmental
Mekong River Commission, which coordinates and proposes legislation and provides scientific monitoring
of the inland waterways. See Mekong River Commission, Agreement on the Cooperation for the
Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, Apr. 5, 1995, available at
http://www.mrcmekong.org/agreement_95/ agreement_95.htm.
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Unfortunately, the current fishing system in place on the Tonle Sap
provides for only a modicum of order and restraint. Access to the Tonle Sap
for fishing is governed by the 1987 Fisheries Law,34 which divides inland
fishery access into publicly auctioned lots and an open access system.35 Lot
ownership is favored over open access because it gives the lot owner a
limited lease to fish the entire lot area, while in the open access areas, where
few regulations exist, fishermen must stake out the best areas and fight off
other fishermen. Because of this confusion, many try to live as close as
possible to the best fishing areas, even building houses on stilts over these
spots.36 This lack of equal access rights gives rise to frequent, violent
clashes between lot owners and open access users.37 Further “anarchy in the
fisheries sector” 38 includes the use of samras, a fishing method of using tree
branches placed in the water to concentrate and harvest fish using seine nets,
occupation of water without permits, and illegal catching of pangasius
fingerlings.39
Responding to the increased need for order that the old laws do not
provide, the Cambodian Fisheries Department has implemented two fiveyear “Fisheries Sector Development Plan[s].”40 In addition, the government
recently made all capture of giant catfish illegal.41 The government has also
attempted to separate the fishery users into three categories: 1) communitybased fishers; 2) mid-sized fishers; and 3) industrial-sized fishers.42 This is

34
Fiat-Law on Fishery Management and Administration, State Council, No. 33 KRO.CHOR
(enacted Mar. 9, 1987).
35
See NICOLAAS VAN ZALINGE, MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION FISHERIES PROGRAM, DATA
REQUIREMENTS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ON THE TONLE SAP, http://www.fao.org/documents/
show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/005/ad070e/ad070e0a.htm (last visited May 8, 2006). Fishing lots are
auctioned off in a competitive public system for two-year periods and the largest lots are nearly 500 square
kilometers. Lot owners are allowed to harvest at the maximum levels designated by the MAFF. See ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 35.
36
VAN ZALINGE, supra note 35. Often Cambodians build houses on stilts to ensure being nearest the
water even during flooded seasons.
37
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY, REPORT ON “THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES AND
ACTION PLAN OF GOOD GOVERNANCE” IN FISHERIES SECTOR 1-2 (2002), available at
http://www.maff.gov.kh/pdf/CamfishGAP.PDF.
38
Id. at 3.
39
Id. at 4.
40
DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, SECOND FIVE-YEAR FISHERIES SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PLAN 20002005, at 1-5 (2001), available at http://www.maff.gov.kh/pdf/5-yearplan0105eng.pdf (English translation
on official website).
41
Lovgren, supra note 25, at 3.
42
See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9.
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part of an effort to give subsistence fishermen and their families a protected
community-based fishery, off-limits to other users.43
C.

Cambodia’s Increasing Population, Growing Market Share, and
Erratic Land Use Strain Its Natural Resources

As Cambodia’s population and industrial activity increases, the
divergence between big cities and rural areas has grown.44 Economic
activity has consistently increased over the past fifteen years. The
population, too, has increased rapidly with 43% of Cambodians below
fifteen years of age.45 While Phnom Penh has benefited from the increased
economic activity, the rural areas, which contain the largest populations,
have seen little improvement. Indeed, as much as eighty percent of
Cambodia’s rural population lives in poverty.46 Literacy rates are low, and
lack of news and political information is pervasive throughout these areas.47
While the influx of money and interest from abroad has benefited
Cambodia’s economy, the country has overburdened infrastructure
development.48 Even though roughly 75% of the population works in
agriculture, more young people are moving into the cities for factory work.49
The increase in the cities’ populations stresses basic sanitation and access to
housing. As a consequence, more housing is being created in a vacuum of
planning and basic sewerage systems.50 As Cambodia’s biggest city, Phnom
Penh’s disorderly expansion has a direct impact on the Tonle Sap. When the
Mekong reverses51 it transports waste back into the Tonle Sap.52 Thus,
43

See Meredith A. Giordano, Managing the Quality of International Rivers: Global Principles and
Basin Practice, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 111 (2003). The author gives a general overview of practices on
large river basins and suggests the need for water quality institutions.
44
Cambodia’s population as of 2003 was expanding at a rate of 2.3%, and the population was nearly
14 million in 2005. See DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, supra note 40, at 2.
45
Id. at 2. Population is projected to be 14 million by 2005.
46
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 1, 5.
47
See id.; see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS, CAMBODIA INTER-CENSAL POPULATION
SURVEY (CIPS) 2004: WOMEN IN CAMBODIA, available at http://www.nis.gov.kh/SURVEYS/depthcips04/
wc_cips/summary_wc.htm.
48
JOHN
DENNIS,
A
REVIEW
OF
NATIONAL
SOCIAL
POLICIES:
CAMBODIA,
http://www.mekonginfo.org/mrc_en/doclib.nsf/0/2A94925F72E170CBC725682E002A8D30/$FILE/FULL
TEXT.html (last visited June 17, 2006)
49
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 7.
50
Karen A. Tramontano, Stitching Up Global Labor Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2004, at A23,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56426-2004Dec10.html.
51
The Mekong floods and reverses direction once annually. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE
MEKONG PEOPLE 12 (2004), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/GMS/2004/gmspeople.pdf.
52
Tom Fawthrop, The Price of Free Trade—Part II: The End of Textile Export Quotas Cushion May
Confront Cambodia with the Hard Realities of the Global Marketplace, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, Oct.1,
2004, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4627.
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proper planning is required to make this population transition ultimately
beneficial to all Cambodians in the years to come.
As the cities expand, the rural areas have seen little improvement.
Poor education is a predominant characteristic of people on the Tonle Sap,
especially among women.53 There is also a lack of medical access, although
Cambodia is responding by implementing non-profit medical care.54 These
problems are amplified on the Tonle Sap, where access to medical care,
education, and information are limited.55 The Basin’s relative isolation has
also created difficulties in implementing fishery and forestry management
policy.56 Moreover, damming of the lower Mekong will put these
populations at further risk due to reduced water flow and fish habitat.57
Further, the confusion created by Cambodia’s relatively new system of
private land tenure58 has exacerbated poor land use planning on the Tonle
Sap. On the one hand, private land ownership has lead to unchecked and
erratic construction in critical areas on the Tonle Sap, increasing
sedimentation and decreasing points of access.59 On the other hand, the new
land laws have created confusion for much of the rural poor regarding land
titles and boundary resolution.60 Many people simply have no concept or
desire to title land they have always used. However, those who do not title
their land face the possibility of losing it to the government.61 Moreover,
with the increase in population, clashes have grown over competition for
owning land.62 Lastly, tension between ethnic Vietnamese and native Khmer
peoples has increased due to uneven land titling and resource exploitation.63

53
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS, 1998 LITERACY CENSUS OF CAMBODIA, available at
http://www.nis.gov.kh/CENSUSES/Census1998/literacy.htm.
54
Celia W. Dugger, Cambodia Tries Nonprofit Path to Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006.
55
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 5.
56
See DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, supra note 40, at 1-4.
57
See Piyaporn Wongruang, Study Planned for Two Dams, BANGKOK POST (Thail.), Oct. 4, 2005.
58
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LAND ACQUISITION AND RESETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR THE
TONLE SAP SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROJECT (2005), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/
Resettlement_Plans/CAM/LARF-TSS.pdf.
59
See MOK MARETH ET AL., BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ON THE TONLE SAP
WATERSHED: THE TONLE SAP BIOSPHERE RESERVE (2001), available at http://www.earthscape.org/r1/
cbs01/cbs01a13aa.html.
60
See Cambodia Center for Human Rights, Police Killed 5 in Poipet: A Case of Violent Land
Evictions, First Quarterly Report at 17-20 (2005).
61
See Joanne Pawlowski, Forced Evictions of Cambodia’s Poor, HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNE, vol. 11,
n.3 (2005), http://www.hri.ca/tribune/onlineissue/V11-3-2005/Evictions_in_Cambodia.html.
62
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 2.
63
Although many of the “ethnic Vietnamese” were born in Cambodia, there nonetheless exists
tension and animosity with those with “full” Khmer nationality. See id. at 6.
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THE LAWS GOVERNING THE TONLE SAP: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT
LAND, FORESTRY AND FISHERY LAWS

Given the unique hydrology and sheer size of the Tonle Sap, the
Forestry and Land Use laws have almost as large an impact as the Fishery
Laws. Because the new laws ought to create sustainable practices, a brief
description of the theory and an example of sustainable resource
management will precede an examination of the historical and legal
developments of the land use, fishery, and forestry laws.
A.

The Sustainability Theory Contributes Several Basic Factors to Be
Considered in Any Legal Framework

The word “sustainability” has specific meaning in the context of
resource management. Sustainability refers to a type of control of a
common-pool resource (“CPR”) to prevent its destruction and maintain its
long-term productivity.64 Elinor Ostrom, an expert on the governance of
common pool resources, suggests five elements of a sustainable fishery: 1)
clear property rights; 2) collective choice governance; 3) close monitoring;
4) clear sanctions; and 5) dispute-resolution capacity.65 While existence of
these five factors66 is only prima facie evidence of a sustainable fishery,
nearly all successful fisheries possess these characteristics.67 The five
elements function in concert, preventing overuse caused by self-interested
users maximizing personal profit at the expense of the common resource.68
Larger fisheries require coercion or a “special device” because “rational selfinterested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests.”69 Creating fishery laws with these five elements in mind helps to
avoid the tragedy of the commons70 and to establish sustainable fishery
64
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 (1990).
65
Id. at 2, 3, 5.
66
Gregory Maggio suggests a reduced three critical elements for sustainable resources: 1)
“recognizing resource access rights and security for local communities; [2)] enabling local communities to
participate effectively in resource management decisions under the regimes; and [3)] requiring equitable
sharing with local communities of benefits arising out of the use of natural resources.” G. F. Maggio,
Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for Conserving
Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 179, 180 (1998).
67
Cf. JOSEPH C. DUPRIS ET AL., THE SI’LAILO WAY: INDIANS, SALMON AND LAW ON THE COLUMBIA
RIVER 15 (2006).
68
OSTROM, supra note 64, at 2 (discussing the tragedy of the commons in general).
69
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 2 (1965) (emphasis removed).
70
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 162. This is a
seminal work on the tragedy that ensues when users of a common-pool resource seek to further their
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management.71 At the same time, one must bear in mind the relentless and
deeply historical aspects of over-fishing.72
An example of the successful application of Ostrom’s five factors can
be found at the Celilo Falls fishery, on the Columbia River, Oregon.73 In
1934, Warm Springs, Umatilla, and Yakima Indians created the Celilo
Fishery Committee (“Committee”) to manage salmon fishing on at Celilo
Falls.74 Although the Indians had the technology to over-fish, they chose a
markedly divergent, sustainable path instead.75 The Committee represented
nearly all the Indians who had a property right derived from treaties with the
U.S. to fish at the “usual and accustomed”76 places along the Dalles and
Columbia Rivers.77 The Committee created its own bylaws by means of
discussion and collective action.78 Moreover, the rules were enforced by
imposing sanctions on members who failed to meet the community’s
expectations.79 Given the nature of fishing with dip-nets80 on shared

individual goals and needs at the expense of the resource itself. Hardin demonstrates the tragedy of the
commons by reference to herdsmen, who each rationally seeks to maximize his herd on a common plot of
land. For each added animal, the herdsman gains one unit of value, but the cost of over-grazing by having
more animals is shared by everyone. This externalization of negative costs leads to more and more animals
being added until the resource itself cannot support any of the animals and the herders thus kill off the
common resource. This situation has repeated itself in many arenas, not just environmental ones.
71
See Tundi Agardy, An Environmentalist’s Perspective on Responsible Fisheries: The Need for
Holistic Approaches, presented at Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem
(Oct. 1-4, 2001), available at http://www.fao.org/fi/meetings/Reykjavik/default.asp. Agardy presents the
model of cooperative management strategies that involve all users to insure long-lasting fisheries.
72
See JEREMY JACKSON ET AL., HISTORICAL OVERFISHING AND THE RECENT COLLAPSE OF COASTAL
ECOSYSTEMS, SCIENCE, July 27, 2001; see also Cornelia Dean, About the Oceans, He Says Firmly,
Attention Must Be Paid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, at F2. The realist’s view is that over-fishing is simply
inescapable.
73
The installation of a dam on the Dalles River effectively killed off the Celilo Falls fishery in 1957.
However, before the arrival of the dam, fishing practices were consummately sustainable, as defined by
Ostrom’s five-factors. DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 67, at 18.
74
See id.
75
See id. at 339-360. While they had the ability to over-fish, they thought of the future generations’
need to fish and subsequently limited their take. Sampson Tulee’s will encapsulates the Indians’
sustainable vision for the Columbia. In his will, he gave his interests in the fishery to his children and their
children in perpetuity: in fee tail. Id. at 20. Indeed, it was the over-fishing and damming activity of the
newcomer Europeans and Chinese that destroyed this fishery.
76
Id. at 109-110. This was the treaty language used to guarantee tribal fishing rights.
77
Id. at 200-201.
78
Id. at 215-217.
79
Id. at 208-09. Pensus B. “Peanuts” Finley was the only person the Committee excluded from
Celilo, given his generally unwelcome demeanor. Tom Nye was also sanctioned (his fish were confiscated
and he was excluded from the best platforms) because he not only broke the ban on night fishing, but he
broke another’s dip net. Id.
80
Id. at 11-17. A dip-net is a long pole with a net on the end, used to capture salmon migrating up
through rivers especially in turbulent water. One would dip the pole deep in the water and salmon were
easily plucked from the water.
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platforms, close monitoring was conducted by the fishery’s own users.81
The Committee also served as the vehicle for resolving disputes between
users.82 Most importantly, members of the Committee were also users of the
resource and had a stake in its perpetual existence.83 The Celilo Falls fishery
is an important example of possibility of a sustainable fishery and the
strength of Ostrom’s five-factor analysis.
B.

The Evolution of the Land Use Laws Reflect a Transition from
Socialism to Privatization

Cambodia’s private property ownership regime is a recent
development, reflecting not only its socialist past, but also the confusion
wrought by its post-colonial transition. Even after Pol Pot lost power in
1979, the notion of private property did not reappear until 1989.84 Indeed, in
1979, the Khmer Rouge’s successors, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea
(“PRK”), established a system of collective ownership whereby private
ownership rules were based merely on occupancy and no true private title
existed.85 With another change of government in 1989 that created the State
of Cambodia, the government established limited private land tenure.86 At
the same time, the State of Cambodia did not recognize any traditional rights
to the land.
A major step toward formal and complex land ownership rights
occurred when the recently formed Kingdom of Cambodia87 set out a new
system of land laws in 1992.88 With 227 articles, the Land Law of 1992

81

Id. at 204.
Id. at 215-217.
83
See id. at 20. Had the Dalles Dam not been built and fishing controlled by Indian laws, the fishery
would likely still exist today.
84
See John Dennis, supra note 48.
85
Indira Simbolon, Access to Land of Highland Indigenous Minorities: The Case of Plural Property
Rights in Cambodia, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers, Working Paper No. 42
(2002), at 13.
86
Id. at 14. Three types of ownership were created: (1) private ownership around homes under
2000 square meters; (2) usufruct rights to state owned plots of less than 5 hectares; and (3) concession
rights to expand agricultural areas larger than 5 hectares.
87
See Malcom Falkus & Stephen Frost, Labour Relations and Regulations in Cambodia: Theory and
Practice, Working Papers Series No. 38, City University of Hong Kong (2002), at 2-3, available at
http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/WP38_02_FalkusFrost_Full.pdf.
The Kingdom of Cambodia is a
constitutional monarchy, with King Samdech Norodom Sihanouk Varaman serving much like the English
monarchs, allowing Parliament to do much of the legislative work. Parliament is bicameral, with most
power being in the National Assembly, though a Senate exists. There is also an independent judiciary with
a Supreme Court.
88
Land Law of 1992, Kret-Chbab/100 (enacted on Aug. 10, 1992).
82
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created general rules of private property ownership.89 Despite the apparent
transparency of these laws, their creation resulted in uneven distribution of
property and surreptitious land grabbing by the government.90 The Land
Law of 1992 permitted the government to prey on the ignorance of citizens
and eject those who merely did not follow a new procedure to title land. 91
Use of force was not uncommon in ejecting tenants.92 These actions sparked
international debate.93
Subsequently, the Land Law of 2001 was created and appears to have
rectified many of the problems inherent in the Land Law of 1992.94 For
example, it establishes protection for public lands and ecological reserves.95
However, complaints of discretionary abuses remain, and the cadastral
process of boundary disputes remains extremely slow due to the
overwhelming number of disputes.96 Land grabbing continues.97 In
addition, a clause in Article 12 of the Land Law of 2001 provides the state
with a reversionary interest98 in all lands.99 This flexible standard allows the
government to appropriate lands for any “reasonable” public use if the users
89

See id. The eight types of land ownership are: 1) estate ownership; 2) temporary possession; 3)
ownership dismemberment; 4) real-estate secured transactions; 5) succession; 6) sale of real estate; 7)
rights conservation of the estate; and 8) regulation of real estate.
90
King Delivers Justice in Ratanakiri Land Case, Legal Aid of Cambodia Quarterly, May 2002, 1-4;
see also Pawlowski, supra note 61.
91
Land Law of 1992, supra note 88, art. I (stating that all land in Cambodia belongs to the state).
92
Legal Aid of Cambodia, Officials Use Cancelled Land Titles to Lease Land, LEGAL AID OF
CAMBODIA Q., Feb. 2003, at 5-6, http://www.lac.org.kh/final_quarterly_newslater_feb_2003.pdf.
93
See generally Shaun Williams, Review of Current and Proposed Cambodian Land Legislation,
OXFAM Cambodia Land Study Project (May 1999), available at http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/
Land/Docs/draftlandlaw/review_of_current_and_proposed_Cambodian_landlegislation.htm.
Given the
drafting flaws and abuses that resulted, domestic and international NGOs heavily criticized the Land Law
of 1992, spurring legislative action.
94
Land Law of 2001, art. 4 (Cambodia), available at http://www.gocambodia.com/laws/pdf/LAW01-Land%20Law-E.pdf (official law in Khmer).
95
Id. art. 11; see also William Chapman, “The Best Laid Schemes . . .”: Land-Use Planning and
Historic Preservation in Cambodia, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 529 (1998).
96
Legal Aid of Cambodia, Annual Report 2001, ch. 6 (2002), available at
http://www.lac.org.kh/annual_report_2001.htm; see also Alyssa A. Vegter, Forsaking the Forests for the
Trees: Forestry Law in Papau New Guinea Inhibits Indigenous Customary Ownership, 14 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 545 (2005) (describing the similarly slow process of settling indigenous land disputes in Papua
New Guinea).
97
Guy De Launey, Cambodia ‘Suffering Land Crisis,’ BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4207138.stm
98
A reversionary interest is an interest in land that will revert to the grantor when the current owner
dies or gives up her interest in the property at issue. See Joseph William Singer, PROPERTY LAW: RULES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, 572 (3d ed. 2002).
99
“The State is the owner of the properties in the territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia . . . and of
all properties that are escheat, or that are voluntarily given to the State by their owners, or that have not
been subject to due and proper private appropriation or that are not presently being privately occupied in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4 of this law.” Land Law of 2001, supra note 94, art. 12
(emphasis added).
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fail to register properly the land. Arguably, Article 44 of the Constitution
should govern Article 12, making such an escheat100 subject to public policy
considerations. However, no explicit reference is made in the Land Law and
the link remains vague at best.101
Moreover, the Land Law does not explicitly reference sustainable use
or development of lands, especially those bordering inland fisheries.
Concessions102 generally are available for “social and economic purposes,”
but there is no formal system of granting lands for fishing.103 Rather, the
only major land laws that refer to fishing access are a 1989 Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (“MAFF”) proclamation creating fishing
lots, and a 1993 proclamation of protected areas (including the Tonle Sap).104
Thus, the 2001 Land Law sets few limits on the scope of development in and
around the Tonle Sap Basin.
C.

The Forestry Law Projects an Honest Attempt at Conservation and
Sustainable Management, but Creates Loopholes Regarding Fishery
Protection

Given the Tonle Sap’s unique hydrology and interplay with
surrounding forest and agricultural lands, the Forestry Law has a major
impact on the Tonle Sap.105 In 2002, a new set of Forestry Laws was
adopted, creating a new legal regime focused on sustainable use of
Cambodia’s limited forest reserves.106 The law’s sustainable mission
appears directly in the preamble.107 This language responds to the
destructive and erratic logging practices that persisted under prior laws and

100
A reversion of property to the state where the owner dies without heirs or the property is
abandoned. Here, abandonment can be found if the property is not properly titled. See SINGER ET AL.,
supra note 98, at 561.
101
See id.
102
A concession is defined as: “A government grant for specific privileges.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 307 (8th ed. 2004).
103
Land Law of 2001, supra note 94.
104
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 1989 Proclamation of the Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (1989); see also Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Regulations on the
Creation and Designation of Protected Areas (1993).
105
See Andy Weiner, Comment, The Forest and the Trees: Sustainable Development and Human
Rights in the Context of Cambodia, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2003) (offering a general summary of the
forestry laws and status of sustainable forestry practice in Cambodia).
106
See Forestry Law, adopted Aug. 2002, at pmbl., available at http://www.maff.gov.kh/pdf/
ForestryLaw.pdf (unedited translation).
107
This law defines the framework for management, harvesting, use, development, and reservation of
the forests in the Kingdom of Cambodia. Pursuant to the National Forest policy, the principle objective of
this Law is to ensure, for present and future generations, the sustainable management of these forests for
their social, economic and environmental benefits. Id. ch. 1, art. 1.
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the system of uneven concession granting.108 Indeed, since the 1990s, due in
part to illegal logging,109 Cambodia has lost ten percent of its forest cover,
representing a reduction from 13 million hectares to 11.2 million hectares.110
The Forestry Law centralizes control over concession granting in the
MAFF.111 Additional legislation creates limits and clarifies the requirements
for concessions.112
The Forestry Law’s goal of sustainability relies upon establishing the
permanent forest estate,113 a protective boundary that can extend to all
forests, public and private. Thus, there is a permanently protected forest,
off-limits to logging, and another that is open to regulated logging. Within
the public forests, termed the permanent forest reserve, concessions and
logging activities are subject to strict management, with broad commands
for sustainability.114 While some of the language remains vague and broad,
sub-decrees have been and will be established to make more specific
commands.115 The Forestry Law also makes use of centralized command
and control authority in MAFF.116
While the Forestry Law addresses animal management and
regulation,117 it exempts all fish and aquatic life from its scope.118 Moreover,
the law does not explicitly address inundated forests, which are key to the
health of the Tonle Sap. Further, the only regulation related to sedimentation

108
David Lyon, Battling Cambodia’s Illegal Timber Trade, BBC NEWS, May 16, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1989847.stm. Concessions granted for forestry practices
include the limited right to harvest timber, however, the MAFF has control over the scope of these
concessions. See Weiner, supra note 105, at 1546.
109
See Jennifer Lynn Peters, Land and Resource Management: The Illegal Trafficking of Timber in
Cambodia, 1999 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 102 (1999).
110
See Phillip Hirsch, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Underlying Causes of
Deforestation in the Mekong Region (1999), available at http://www.iges.or.jp/en/fc/phase1/3ws-20hirsch.pdf; see also Heather Wolf, Deforestation in Cambodia and Malaysia: The Case for an International
Legal Solution, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 429, 431 (1996). Concessions under the new Forestry Law refer
to “a contract between the State and a concessionaire for the harvest rights to timber products and NTFPs
from a designated production forest within the permanent forest reserve.” Forestry Law, supra note 105,
art. 5(13). That contract cannot extend beyond thirty years and is terminable by the MAFF. Id. art 18.
Fishery concessions differ in that they are a limited grant given by lottery to fisherman and are more a paidfor license than a contract. See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 18.
111
Forestry Law, supra note 106.
112
Total laod: declaration (Prakas) No. 527, Dec. 25, 2001; Concession rules: declaration (Prakas)
No. 5721, Dec. 13, 2001.
113
Forestry Laws, supra note 106 at ch. 4. This includes important areas and critical habitat.
114
Id. art. 11
115
See MAFF e-Library, http://www.maff.gov.kh/e-library/e-library.html.
116
See Organization Chart of MAFF, http://www.maff.gov.kh/structure.html. MAFF creates
substantive policy to regulate specific forests with unique management issues.
117
Forestry Laws, supra note 106, ch. 10.
118
Id. art. 49.
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refers to mining and excavating activities, not logging.119 Erosion from
deforestation and farmed land contributes damaging silt to the Tonle Sap,
reducing its productive capacity.120 This creates a gap in coverage of
forestry resources with an indirect, yet substantial impact on the fisheries.121
While it makes sense for gaps in the law to be rectified at the administrative
level, it puts an unnecessary burden on the MAFF.122 While flexibility and
discretion can help adapt rigid laws to unique circumstances, too much
discretion can lead to unplanned and poor management.
D.

The 1987 Fisheries Law Remains Outdated and Fails to Project a
Vision of Sustainability for the Tonle Sap Basin

The 1987 Fisheries Law has failed in large part due to its narrow
scope and emphasis on state-run fish harvesting. Formed under the socialist
PRK government, the law gave special rights to “government fishing
enterprise or solidarity groups which [have] a right to do fishing in the
fishing lots.”123 That right “must be absolutely respected.”124 This
concentrates the power of state-run fishing, allowing it to be more expansive
and free from competition. However, the law does not actually regulate
anything more than subsistence and mid-scale fishing. Consequently, the
absence of regulation for industrial fishing has proven to be problematic as
Cambodia has left behind the socialist regime and entered the free market.
Indeed, the absence of positive law has created loopholes favoring unchecked exploitation.125
The authors of the 1987 Fisheries Law also failed to study and plan
for the current levels of use on the Tonle Sap. Although available fishery
catch depends on the amount of water in the lake,126 the actual catch has
increased at dramatically higher levels. One study suggests that in 1987 the
119

Id. art. 36(B)(1).
Janet Larsen, Earth Policy Institute, Disappearing Lakes, Shrinking Seas, Apr. 7, 2005, at 3.
Even assuming that the Fisheries Law is in place to govern some logging activity that harms the
Tonle Sap, this type of gap in coverage allows users to skirt around the laws and exploit loopholes.
122
See Forestry Law, art. 10(B). Gaps in the laws appear because the Parliament has created a
separate set of laws for each sector of the MAFF. For example, where fisheries come up in the Forestry
Law, the laws specifically say that “fish and animals that breed in water” are outside the scope of the laws.
See id. art. 49(A). Parliament seems to expect MAFF to be able to coordinate and synthesize all of the laws
to avoid any gaps. This puts a heavy burden on MAFF.
123
Fiat-Law, supra note 34, art. 8.
124
Id.
125
See Chou Meng Tarr, Learning Across Boundaries on the Greater Mekong Sub-region, Fishing
Lots and People in Cambodia (2003), http://www.rockmekong.org/pubs/ Year2003/social/13_chou.pdf.
126
See E. Baran and T.A. Jantunen, Bayfish—Tonle Sap: A Bayesian Model of the Fish Production in
the Tonle Sap Great Lake, Cambodia, in MODSIM 2005 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MODELLING AND
SIMULATION 2312 (A. Zerger & R.M. Argent eds., 2005).
120
121
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annual catch totaled approximately 60,000 tons, but has since increased to
nearly 100,000 tons.127 This is especially true of inland aquaculture, which
the 1987 Fisheries Law limited and made largely contingent on special
permission.128 As the population and demand for resources increased, the
1987 Fisheries Law has proven unable to address and protect adequately the
needs of the Tonle Sap for a sustainable future.
Much has changed since 1987, and subsequent legislation reflects a
newfound concern for the Tonle Sap. For example, in 1995 the MAFF
implemented new regulations to create better “management and eliminat[e] .
. . anarchy in [the] fisheries sector.”129 The regulations attempted to
decrease the violent territorial clashes between the increasing number of
mid-sized fishing outfits and smaller individual fishermen.130
Responding to the 1987 Fisheries Law’s shortcomings, the
government has authorized two five-year Fisheries Sector Development
Plans (“Five Year Plan”) drafted by MAFF. The 1996 Five Year Plan
marked the first detailed socioeconomic and biologic studies of fishing on
the Tonle Sap. The second Five Year Plan has continued adding regulations
and more survey data. Recommendations are made for the proper
management practices to respond to the changes in fish populations and
habitat and fishing practices. Both Five Year Plans show particular reliance
on outside loans, grants, and assistance from such international organizations
as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. In addition, a regional
agreement between Cambodia and its neighbors protects the Mekong.131

127
D. Lamberts, Tonle Sap Fisheries: A Case Study on Floodplain Gillnet Fishing in Siem Reap,
Cambodia, RAP Publication AB561/E (2001), available at http://www.fao.org/documents/show_
cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/004/ab561e/ab561e05.htm.
128
See id.; see also, Fiat Law, supra note 34, art. 19. Since the mid-1990s, however, there has been
considerable growth in aquaculture production of fish and shrimp to nearly 15,000 tons a year in 2000. See
Lamberts, supra note 126.
129
DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, supra note 40, at 2.
130
Id. In 1997, Cambodia designated the Tonle Sap as an international biosphere reserve, pursuant to
UNESCO and in response to its increasingly recognized international importance. See United Nations
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, supra note 14. Moreover, the Asian Development Bank
has loaned millions to help stabilize and expand the fishing practices on the Tonle Sap, following up on this
UNESCO designation. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7.
131
Darren Posey, Defining Interest: The Mekong River Commission, J. INT’L POL’Y SOLUTIONS, Feb.
17, 2005, available at http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/IPS/Defining%20Interests%20The%20Mekong%
20River%20Commission.pdf. “The MRC’s mandate is to support and coordinate the sustainable
development of the Lower Mekong River Basin (LMRB), which runs through [Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao
PDR, and Thailand]. However, the MRC was designed without the ability to coerce its members or punish
violators of its policies. For this reason, realists have often maligned the MRC as an example of yet
another ineffectual international regime.” Id.
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The Mekong River Commission (“MRC”) embodies a multi-national effort
to develop sustainable practices throughout the Mekong River Basin.132
In addition to the Five Year Plans, the Draft Fisheries Law of 2001
(“Draft Fisheries Law”) proposes a much tighter nexus of protective laws
aimed at building sustainable regulations of fishery practices for inland and
marine fish exploitation.133 The law reflects the expansion of private fishing
outfits, especially industrial ones. At the same time, the law gives special
rights to family-scale production in order to protect subsistence fishing
practices on the Tonle Sap and inland waterways.134 Further, the law creates
broader protections from encroachment for flood-inundated forests.135 The
1987 Fisheries Law states only that “chopping, reclaiming or firing [sic] the
inundated forest” is prohibited, whereas the Draft Fisheries Law establishes
a protected area around all inundated forests, calling for conservation and
replanting.136 While this Comment explores the drafting flaws and policy
errors in the Draft Fisheries Laws, it should be noted that the Draft Laws
provide a comparatively strong alternative to the 1987 Fisheries Law.
IV.

COVERAGE GAPS, LOOPHOLES AND DRAFTING DEFECTS: THE LEGAL
INADEQUACIES OF THE LAWS CURRENTLY GOVERNING THE TONLE SAP

Cambodia’s current legal regime for its fisheries fails to meet the
broad policy goal of sustainability and fails to create strong, justified legal
standards. The laws themselves lack clear definitions, transparency and
proper enforcement mechanisms. This section examines the shortcomings
of the laws at play on the Tonle Sap. First, the current and draft Fisheries
Laws fail to meet the Cambodian Constitution’s limits and requirements.
Second, the Draft Fisheries Law places unwise discretion in the minister of
MAFF, while failing to prevent adverse land use. Lastly, in light of the
limited scope of the water pollution laws, the current and draft Fisheries
Laws fail to make agricultural activity subject to either law, thus, allowing
chemical fertilizers and pesticides to enter the Tonle Sap.

132

See Mekong River Commission, supra note 33; see also Adam S. Rix, The Mekong River Basin: A
Resource at the Cross-Roads of Sustainable Development, 21 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 103 (2003); see
also Brian Shanahan, Agreement for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 8 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 496 (1996).
133
See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9. This has yet to be adopted, although a version has
circulated through Parliament.
134
Id. art. 15.
135
Id. arts. 33, 34.
136
Fiat Law, supra note 34, art. 18(d); Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, arts. 33, 34.
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A.

The Current Fishery Laws Fail to Meet the Strictures of the 1993
Constitution

Cambodia’s most recent Constitution establishes broad environmental
conservation goals that the 1987 Fisheries Law fails to meet. Specifically,
the 1993 Constitution proclaims that:
The State shall protect the environment and balance of
abundant natural resources and establish a precise plan of
management of [natural] resources.137
A close reading of the 1987 Fisheries Law reveals that it fails to establish
any “precise plan” for management and “protect the environment.”138
The 1987 Fisheries Law lacks a comprehensive or “precise” plan of
management. Whereas the Draft Fisheries Law sets out a preamble
projecting the conservation and management goals of the laws, the 1987
Fisheries Law fails to announce any sort of environmental conservation
plan.139 While one can ascertain a program of action, it is negatively stated,
with no orderly arrangement of an overall objective that can be easily
distinguished and applied. The law haphazardly explains where and what
types of fishing are allowed, and how the penalties for violations of the law
can be assessed and enforced. It fails to establish a means of creating a total
allowable catch,140 and fails to explain why certain fishing practices are
forbidden and when fishing cannot be conducted. The law does not create
any stakeholder participation in planning or enforcement.141 A precise plan
for conservation requires an assignment of rights to individual users that
places economic and non-economic interests in the ongoing viability and
health of the CPR.142 Substantively, the law does establish some boundaries
for protection. It calls for the creation of sanctuaries to be free from fishing,
forbids “chopping, reclaiming or firing [sic] the inundated forests,” and bans
“all means of pumping, bailing, drying any part of fishery domain.”143
137
Kingdom of Cambodia Constitution (1993) art. 59, available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/
cambodia.htm.
138
See id.
139
See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 1. A plan, according to Merriam Webster’s Dictionary,
is “a detailed formulation of a program of action” or “an orderly arrangement of parts of an overall design
or objective.” Merriam Webster Online-Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/plan.
140
Total allowable catch is seen as a necessary component to restricting over-fishing. It is a common
theme of sustainable fisheries laws, such as those in New Zealand. See Kevin Stoakes, Property Rights and
Ecosystem Management: An Industry Perspective, Bevan Series on Sustainable Fisheries (2006) (abstract
available at http://courses.washington.edu/susfish/speakers/stokes.html).
141
OSTROM, supra note 64.
142
See id. at 3.
143
Fiat Law, supra note 34, art. 18.
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However, the Constitution requires more than mere designations and denials;
it requires a precise plan.
One obvious reason for the unconstitutionality of the 1987 Fisheries
Law is mere chronology. The law was drafted under a socialist government
at a time of reduced fishing activity. As such, the drafters focused on
government-run fishing operations.144 At the same time, the drafters give
special rights of easy access for subsistence fishing,145 while giving few
rights to medium sized fishing and aquaculture.146 Moreover, the 1987
Fisheries Law does not envision the expansion of fish exports or integrating
the Tonle Sap with international markets—a practice currently underway.147
While the Draft Fisheries Law divides fishing practices into the same three
categories, it focuses on parity between all users.
B.

The Land Concession Provisions and Discretionary Exceptions for
Dams in the Draft Fisheries Law Create Loopholes

While the Draft Fisheries Law presents a constitutionally valid148 and
more comprehensive set of conservation-oriented laws, it vests too much
discretion in the minister of MAFF with regard to the Tonle Sap. By giving
the minister of MAFF discretion to grant permits for dam creation and
certain agricultural development,149 the law fails to protect the Tonle Sap.
Limits do not exist to cabin the minister’s discretion, and he is relatively free
to decide when to allow these damaging practices. This uncertainty burdens
all users and reduces overall participation in the regulatory scheme.
Moreover, damming has been noted as one of the more ruinous practices,
since reduced flow and access will drastically reduce fish populations and
the overall catch on the Tonle Sap.150 However, because power supply in
Cambodia continues to be unreliable and a source of frustration for

144

See id. art. 8.
See id. art. 11. This section allows for year-round fishing even in protected areas and during the
closed season.
146
Now, however, these two practices have grown tremendously and need better organization and
legal supervision. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 2.
147
Although the laws are silent on fish exportation, the Department of Fisheries does take into
consideration fish exported to Thailand and surrounding countries. See Department of Fisheries, Major
Responsibilities, http://www.maff.gov.kh/depts/dof.html (last visited May 12, 2006).
148
The Draft Fisheries Law satisfies the Constitution’s call for having “precise plan” by inserting
such a plan in the preamble and in the substance of the law. See Merriam Webster Online-Dictionary,
supra note 139.
149
Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 28.
150
See E. Baran et al., supra note 126.
145
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businesses,151 hydroelectric power derived from damming tributary rivers is
planned and underway in some areas.152
Unwisely, Article 28 of the Draft Fisheries Law creates a procedural
loophole regarding the prohibition on damming and destructive activities on
the fishery resources. On its face, Article 28 clearly prohibits “expanding
farming lands in the fishery domains,” “building dikes/dams,” and “any
other activities in the fishery domains that may cause destruction of the
fishery resources.”153 However, the law imbues the minister with discretion
to permit these activities by giving him the power to lift the ban when he
sees fit.154 The law fails to explain the types of circumstances that would
warrant such permission.155 Thus, this vague exception to the prohibition
sets up a procedural loophole with tremendous potential for abuse.156 This
sort of policy undermines predictability and allows certain special interest
groups to occupy positions of power without accountability.157 Proper
conservation policy requires the elimination of ex parte influence, making
discretionary function transparent and as logical as possible.158
The discretionary authority vested in the minister of MAFF by Article
28 may also undermine the explicit prohibition of other activities delineated
in the same subchapter.159 For example, Article 34 creates a clear ban on
using or destroying inundated forests, with no exceptions.160 However, one
might read Article 28, part of the same subchapter as Article 34, as a means
of circumventing Article 34 because the minister would still have general
authority to grant exemptions. This interpretation seems rather unlikely in
151

Guy De Launey, Lights Out in Phnom Penh, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/4740122.stm
152
See
Mekong
Basin
Community
Rights
Project,
Background
Statement,
http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/Environment/Mekong/background.htm; see also James D. Zirin, Cambodia’s
Glimmer of Hope, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2006, at B3.
153
See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, ch. 6, art. 28.
154
Id.
155
See id. arts. 8-9 (the plain language sets no standards to guide the discretion of the minister in
finding exemptions to this rule).
156
See Michael M. Calavan et al., Cambodian Corruption Assessment, USAID ICQ Contract No.
DFD-I-00-03-00139-00, Task Order No. 801, Submitted Aug. 19, 2004, at 2 (“[C]orruption…has reached
‘pandemic’ proportions”).
157
See The World Bank, Anti-Corruption, http://www.worldbank.org (follow “anticorruption”
hyperlink).
158
See Press Release, The World Bank, Cambodia and Donors Resolve to Tackle Impediments to
Development (Mar. 3, 2006) (release no. 2006/295/EAP), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (follow
“news” hyperlink and enter search for “Cambodia donors”).
159
Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, arts. 33-35. Chapter six pertains to the “Management of
Protected Inundated Areas.”
160
Article 34 prohibits “[e]xpanding agricultural lands or using lands in the protected inundated areas
for all purposes excluding development of fisheries [and] [i]ssuance of Land titles in the protected
inundated areas.” Id. art. 34
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light of the clear danger that removal of inundated forests creates. However,
dams can have a significantly deleterious effect on the fishery, and yet there
are means of getting permission to build them. Thus, the lack of clarity
could be used to conclude that the minister of MAFF can allow some
reasonable development for the public good.161 As illustrated by the
previous land laws, the lack of clarity is likely to be exploited.162 A simple
solution would be to explicitly exempt Article 34 from Article 28’s conferral
of the discretionary power to the minister of MAFF.
This Article 28 loophole also raises two other points of conflict
between the International Agreement on the Protection of Wetlands
(“IAPW”)163 and the Environmental Protection and National Resource
Management Laws (“NRML”).164 In 1996 Cambodia officially adopted the
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat.165 While this international agreement is arguably softlaw,166 the law passed by Cambodia does require that it “shall formulate and
implement . . . planning so as to promote the conservation of the wetlands . .
. .”167 The Draft Fisheries Law, however, undermines the conservation of
wetlands by allowing discretionary damming and wetlands development.
Similarly, the Draft Fisheries Law Article 28 waiver provision conflicts with
the NRML because NRML does not allow discretionary exceptions.168
NRML requires that the “natural resources of the Kingdom of Cambodia . . .
shall be preserved, developed and managed to use in a rational and

161

See id. art. 28. The lack of clarity in the language allows for vague definitions that can be
manipulated for improper purposes.
162
This is an especially valid consideration in a country where corruption is “pandemic.” See
Calavan et al., supra note 156, at 2. For example, there was a case in which the government, pursuant to
escheat provisions of the 1992 Land Law tried to deceive and coerce nearly 1,000 indigenous land owners
to give up their rights to 1,250 hectares of land. See Legal Aid of Cambodia et al., Cambodia: Landmark
Indigenous Land Rights Case to Be Heard in Ratanakiri Provincial Court: Background Briefing Memo,
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Cambodia, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/landrightsbck.htm (last visited May 12, 2006).
163
See Adoption of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl
Habitat, Kram, Oct. 22, 1996 [hereinafter Wetlands Kram]; see also Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, U.N.E.S.C.O., available at
http://www.ramsar.org/key_conv_e.htm [hereinafter Wetlands Convention].
164
See Environmental Protection and National Resource Management Laws, Kram, Dec. 24, 1996,
available at http://sunsite.nus.edu.sg/apcel/dbase/cambodia/primary/caaenv.html [hereinafter NRML].
165
Wetlands Kram, supra note 163.
166
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Soft law is: “[c]ollectively, rules that are neither
strictly binding nor completely lacking in legal significance; [and/or] Guidelines, policy declarations, or
codes of conduct that set standards of conduct but are not legally binding.”
167
Wetlands Kram, supra note 163, art. 3.
168
Article 28 states that eight prohibited activities, including damming inundated forests, can “be
conducted only when special permission is given.” Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 28(B).

818

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO.3

sustainable manner.”169 By vesting major discretion in one minister, as
Article 28 does, the ability to rationally preserve, develop and manage
resources in a sustainable manner is less than assured. In a country where
corruption is “pandemic,”170 that discretion will likely be subject to private
interests, which are likely uninterested in sustainability and preservation of
natural resources.
It should also be noted that countries neighboring Cambodia have
considered damming tributary rivers to the Tonle Sap.171 This is a real
problem facing Southeast Asian countries that are attempting to find greater
sources of electricity.172 For example, China has proposed damming the
Mekong, even though there remains much doubt about the efficiency and
strength of such a hydroelectric source.173 Thus, Cambodia must be
assertive in setting its own policy to ensure that others do not undermine the
health of the Tonle Sap.
C.

The Draft Fisheries and Water Pollution Control Laws Fail to
Establish a Means of Preventing the Introduction of Pesticides and
Chemical Fertilizers in the Tonle Sap Basin

The Draft Fisheries Law does not address water pollution.
Consequently, its narrow scope, combined with gaps in the Water Pollution
Control Law (“WPCL”), allows the use of herbicides and pesticides to
degrade the Tonle Sap.174 Just as the U.S. Clean Water Act (“CWA”)
exempts agricultural activities from the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit system,175 the Cambodian laws do
not subject agricultural or arboreal practices to any permitting or planning
regime.176 This oversight, whether purposeful or unintentional, undermines
the Draft Fisheries Law’s attempt to protect the health and sustainability of
the Tonle Sap.
The WPCL presents broad protections against pollution into public
waters, but fails to bring pollutants incident to agricultural activity under its
169

NRML, supra note 164, art. 8.
Calavan et al., supra note 156, at 2.
See
International
Rivers
Network,
IRN’s
Southeast
Asia
Campaign,
http://www.irn.org/programs/seasia/ (last visited May 7, 2006) (detailing recent damming activity in
Southeast Asia).
172
See id.
173
See Posey, supra note 131, at 5-8.
174
See Council of Ministers, Sub-Decree on Water Pollution Control, No: 27 ANRK.BK, Phnom
Penh, Apr. 6, 1999 [hereinafter WPCL].
175
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
176
See WPCL, supra note 174, Annex 3.
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permitting system.177 In many ways, the WPCL is stronger than the CWA, in
that “sources of pollution”178 are defined broadly and not limited to “point
sources.”179 It covers any direct or indirect discharge of pollutants into
public water areas, requiring permits for any such discharges from the
Ministry of Environment (“MOE”).180 However, the WPCL further states
that only those sources listed in an annex shall be required to have a permit
from the MOE, thus narrowing the scope of the law.181 Indeed, agricultural
activity is not listed, although “animal farm[s]” and “aquatic production
processing” are listed.182 Consequently, the WPCL creates the same
loophole as the CWA for non-point sources,183 such as for farms near the
Tonle Sap and its tributaries, which are able to use chemical fertilizers and
pesticides with no regulation from the MOE.184
Further, the WPCL fails to cover pesticide and fertilizer use, and the
Draft Fisheries Law nearsightedly skips over adverse agricultural activity.
While the Draft Fisheries Law does prohibit “expanding agricultural lands or
using lands in the protected inundated areas,”185 it does not address
agricultural uses outside the protected inundated areas. Both Cambodian

177

Id. arts. 10-17.
The law defines a “source of pollution” as “any type of places [sic] such as a dwelling house,
public administrative building, premise, transport facilities, business areas [sic] or service place from which
effluent, pollutants or hazardous substances are directly or indirectly discharged into public water areas or
public drainage systems.” Id. art. 3(b).
179
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining a “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged” and excluding “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows
from irrigated agriculture”).
180
WPCL, supra note 174, art. 10.
181
Id. art. 11.
182
Id. Annex 3.
183
See generally David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory
Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (2005). The
failures of the CWA to limit the introduction of agricultural and industrial waste into American waters
should guide the Cambodian laws given the similarities. The CWA’s biggest failure is in the distinction
made between point and non-point source pollution. See id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000); see 33 U.S.C. §
1362(12), (14) (2000) (detailing the regulations for point and non-point sources). Non-point source
discharge falls outside the regulatory scope of the act. Thus agricultural runoff, including animal waste,
feedlot runoff, and general sediment are unregulated by the CWA, merely because they enter the water
table in what cannot be classified as a “point source.” While the CWA has reduced introduction of
chemicals, poisons and sediment through point sources, the non-point source remains a danger to its
effectiveness. See generally Zaring, supra.
184
WPCL, supra note 174, at Annex 3 (excluding chemical fertilizers and pesticides from a list of
types of pollution for which permits are required).
185
See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 5(A)(3). The laws define protected inundated areas as
the inundated forests areas “which are covered with floodwater during flooding season and important
feeding, spawning and breeding habitats for aquatic animals.” Id.
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and international non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) ought to be
aware of the American example and learn from the CWA’s mistakes.
V.

RECOMMENDATION: CAMBODIA NEEDS TO MEET THE BROAD
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION GOALS OF ITS CONSTITUTION
THROUGH LAND, FORESTRY, AND FISHERY LAWS

Given the defects in the critical laws affecting the Tonle Sap Basin,
there are several recommendations that, if followed, can place Cambodia in
a position to make the Tonle Sap a sustainable fishery. First, the laws must
be tightened to create stronger protections for users and the Tonle Sap itself.
Second, the laws must reference each other and create a much tighter web of
protective mechanisms.
Third, the laws must provide for proper
administrative oversight on both national and local levels to assure an evenhanded regulation of fishery, agricultural, and forestry activities. Lastly,
Cambodia must make good on international agreements to protect the Tonle
Sap from undue influences from other the activities of other Southeast Asian
countries. At the same time, these recommendations must account for the
lack of money and education of the country, as well as its weak enforcement
and the general corruption of the government.
A.

Cambodia Needs to Restructure the Power Allocations Within the
Management and Administrative Regime on the Tonle Sap

Given the size and importance of the Tonle Sap, a more formal and
stricter set of laws and regulations is necessary. Although smaller fisheries
such as Celilo Falls186 were successful with few regulations, a large-scale
fishery such as the Tonle Sap needs formal laws, strict management controls,
and evolving catch limits based on increased scientific data. Regulations
and enforcement must be managed on both a national and local level so as to
avoid devolution of federal authority while ensuring that local users do not
abuse or overuse the resources because of the availability of markets.187 The
key, then, is to ensure participation of local users and officials of every level
in order to design a system to best fit the common pool resource. Emphasis
should be placed in incorporating people of all ethnicities, educational
levels, and each gender into the system of legislation and adjudication on the
Tonle Sap.188
186

See DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 67, at 15.
THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATION 20-21 (Nives Dolsak &
Elinor Ostrom eds., 2003).
188
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 32.
187
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Moreover, several important lessons of the Celilo Fish Committee can
be taken away and applied to the Tonle Sap. First, there must be a means of
allocation of property rights on the fishery in a broad and meaningful way.
Currently, the fish lot system works only to distribute narrowly to a small
number of users, and many users appear to be left out. At the same time,
rather than simply privatize the entire fishery, there can be what Ostrom calls
an “alternative” solution whereby the users “make a binding contract to
commit themselves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves will work
out.”189 That is, users have a property interest that exists only with the
assumption of a quasi-contractual obligation to use the resource in a manner
that benefits all the users. In a sense, this binds all the users to stave off the
tragedy of the commons by reducing the ability to externalize the cost of
over production.190 This self-limitation for the good of the community can
be easily seen at Celilo Falls, where Indian fishermen fished only at certain
times, took just enough to eat and sell for subsistence, and ensured that other
users abided by the rules.191 Second, there must be a means of monitoring
and imposing sanctions for transgression of the laws on the Tonle Sap.
There ought to be both clear rules and locally managed supervisors. Ideally
the supervisors will be the users themselves.192 Indeed, small-scale, selfmanaging fishery communities hold promise for Cambodians who rely on
the resource for subsistence. With a well-placed and functioning regulatory
structure, such alternatives are possible within the broader, national fishery
framework.
Decentralization is often viewed as an ideal method of creating good
governance of CPRs, but this is a new concept in Cambodia, where a strong
centralized government has dominated.193 The success of decentralization in
certain cases has hinged on the degree of cooperation and influence given to
local participants.194 An attractive balancing scheme of local and national
interest might be found in a federalist approach of local supervision with
national administrative and enforcement protections.195 The United States
189

OSTROM, supra note 64, at 15.
Id.
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See DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 67, at 263.
192
OSTROM, supra note 64, at 19-20. In Alanya, Turkey, for example, a small group of about 100
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18-20.
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194
Id. at 368.
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uses this scheme for regional fishery interests where “regional fishery
management councils recommend management plans and regulations to the
Secretary of Commerce, who holds the ultimate authority for their approval
and responsibility for their consistency with federal law.”196 The most
successful approach would likely require local committees working with the
MAFF and regional groups to regulate practices on the Tonle Sap.
B.

Cambodia Must Restructure, Clarify, and Expand the Fishery Laws

Paramount to the creation of a sustainable fishery on the Tonle Sap is
the reformation of the legal regimes affecting the use and development of
the fishery. First, the Draft Fisheries Law must be amended to provide clear
and distinct prohibitions for harmful activities on the basin. Second, the
laws must expand the defined area of the Tonle Sap. Third, the fishery laws
must coordinate with other environmental laws and the 1993 Constitution to
create a clear and comprehensive framework. Fourth, the administrative and
enforcement agencies must be strengthened by greater regional and local
participation.
Assuming the adoption of the Draft Fisheries Law, there are several
loopholes that must be closed to make the laws a basis for a model of
sustainability. First, discretion vested in the Ministry of Fisheries ought to
be limited by removing the open-ended discretionary exemptions in Article
28 of the Draft Fisheries Law. The minister’s power ought to be balanced by
local councils of users who can better monitor and advise MAFF on
important fishery issues. If flexibility is needed, then discretionary
exceptions should derive from a council composed of national, regional, and
local actors who can best assess the impacts of the proposed action. At the
very least, there should be guidelines, such as a “for cause” showing, as to
why an exception should be granted.
Second, the fisheries law must be broadened in scope so as to create a
management system that encapsulates the entire reach of the Tonle Sap.197 If
the area under the scope of the fisheries law does not include the
non-inundated forests and agricultural land, a great amount of silt and
196

Susan Hanna, Transition in the American Fishing Commons: Management Problems and
Institutional Design Challenges, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CHALLENGES AND
ADAPTATION, supra note 187, at 62.
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Setting a protective buffer can be a critical part of establishing a resource management plan. See
James M. Acheson & Jennifer F. Brewer, Changes in the Territorial System of the Maine Lobster Industry,
in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATION, supra note 187, at 54. The
current scope of the protective boundary is simply too small to cover the entire basin. See Creation and
Designation of Protected Areas, Royal Decree, Nov. 1, 1993 (establishing the protective area and defining
its borders) [original on file with author].
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sediment will be further introduced. While removal of inundated forests is a
major cause of destruction of fish, nearby forests on the Mekong and other
rivers can have just as great a negative impact. By broadening the scope of
the laws and the attendant prohibitions, a greater area will come into the
control of the resource management agencies and more comprehensive
decisions can be made.
Structurally, the fisheries law should project a more cohesive and
integrated system of local, regional, and national management. The Asian
Development Bank (“ADB”) recommends a system of decentralization,198
but total independence from MAFF or national groups would probably be
unwise. The collective choice model of governance ought to include the
national as well as the local concerns. At the same time, total national
control is unwise given the lack of “on-the-ground” knowledge and the
strong potential for corruption. A feasible solution to this is a network of
councils to inform all levels of the decision making process. Adjusting the
laws to require local and regional participation in the MOE and MAFF
decision-making will strengthen the laws and rules for better management.
Further, it will avoid the problems that were rampant under the Land Law of
1992 such as a lack of participation and ignorance of the laws. This will
create more thorough and planned decision making.
The network of environmental-related laws must be tightened to work
in concert and to support the Constitution. Between the forestry, land, water
and fishery laws, gaps exist that can and will be exploited by users on all
levels.199 For example, the forestry laws should make explicit reference to
safe harvesting practices in areas critical to inland fisheries. Likewise, the
land laws should make concessions impossible in areas that will have an
adverse impact on the fisheries. This change can be implemented by
amending each law to reference the relevant fishery, forestry or land law. It
can also be done by giving better financing to local and regional bodies, like
MOE, to coordinate the uses subject to all the laws. A broader scope and
more direct referencing between environmental laws will ensure a cohesive
and protective web for inland fisheries.

198

See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 16-19.
Given the fact that corruption is rampant, the silence in the forestry, land and water laws regarding
impacts on the fisheries creates a legal means of avoiding consideration of the fisheries for activities such
as logging, dumping waste or developing lands in wetland areas. Although the laws are designed to be
exclusive to each sector of the MAFF, there needs to be language in each sector’s laws that the laws work
together—that one cannot get around a law by relying on the silence in another.
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Cambodia Must Strengthen Administrative Agencies to Ensure a Fair
System of Fish Lot Lotteries and Enforcement of Sustainable Farming

Proper administration and enforcement will become more necessary
as the Tonle Sap and Cambodia become more widely recognized.200
Currently, the MOE “is a politically weak ministry compared to, for
instance, [MAFF], and has severe difficulties in forcing its will on other
political interests.”201 While the MAFF may become stronger, it does not
have the proper structure to administer and enforce the laws.202 Many
observers have pointed out the lack of agency coordination at local and
regional levels.203 Thus, restructuring and creating local MAFF offices will
help. By involving local actors in the process of establishing, improving and
enforcing the laws, decision-makers will be better informed.
More reliance should also be placed on the Mekong River
Commission (“MRC”).204 The MRC can be relied on to help ensure that the
sustainable practices on the Tonle Sap and regulate damming activity.205
However, the MRC itself needs to be expanded and its regulations made
binding.206 If that can be accomplished, then Cambodia can help limit
adverse impacts of Chinese damming of the Mekong by coordinating the
four member countries in opposition. Moreover, having a broad coalition
that represents both development and preservation interests of four nations
helps ensure well-conceived, multilateral action.
By increasing the strength of the MAFF and MRC, Cambodia can
create a protective network that can contain damaging practices in the
greater Tonle Sap Basin. The MAFF needs greater funding and localization,
while the MRC needs expanded powers. Together, these two policy changes
can provide protection from both domestic and international destruction.
200

See World Lakes Network, supra note 22, at 8-9.
Samath et al., supra note 4, at 356.
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the MRC, http://www.mrcmekong.org/about_mrc.htm#MRC (last visited May 12, 2006).
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Hydropower Development Strategy” hyperlink).
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CONCLUSION

As Cambodia fast-forwards into the modern realities of the twentyfirst century, it faces the challenging dilemma of both preserving and
capitalizing on its natural resources. In a country reliant on manual labor,
agricultural work, and fishing, laws that regulate and protect natural
resources are of extreme importance. Where fishing is concerned, the
Cambodia’s current legal system needs improvement. The current laws
should be replaced with up-to-date and comprehensive laws that establish a
sustainable model for coastal and inland fisheries. Further, the relevant
Water, Land and Forestry laws must be amended to both protect fisheries
from related harmful practices and create secondary protections for fishery
sustainability.
Lastly, Cambodia must reformulate its administrative
structure to enfranchise fishery users at every level, creating a quasi-federal
model of management. Changes in the abovementioned areas will help
Cambodia protect, preserve, and use wisely its largest fishery, the Tonle Sap,
Southeast Asia’s Great Lake.

